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I.   Introduction 
In its recent White Paper on a European 
Communication Policy, the European 
Commission has promised a “fundamentally new 
approach”. The policy is meant to narrow the 
communication gap looming between the 
European Union and its citizens and ultimately to 
map a way towards the development of a 
European public sphere. In contrast to the so-
called ‘Action Plan’ for improving the 
Commission’s own communication from July 
2005, the White Paper is addressed to the EU as a 
whole, including other central institutions, 
member states, European political parties and 
even ‘civil society’. The purpose of this Policy 
Brief is to critically evaluate the proposals 
emanating from the White Paper and to advance 
several suggestions aimed at helping the current 
initiative to have a more tangible and long-term 
effect than its many predecessors, authored by 
Messrs Tindemans, Adonnino, Oostlander, 
DeClerq, Pex or Pinheiro.  
Looking back over the last decade, one can find 
numerous calls to 'reconnect with the citizens' – 
the most prominent being the Convention on the 
Future of Europe with its pledge to extensively 
consult civil society. And the result is well known: 
citizens have remained for the most part 
uninvolved, uninformed and largely unimpressed.  
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However, while the White Paper lacks revolutionary and 
concrete policy proposals, its text is characterised by a 
welcome sense of realism and long-term perspective. The 
approach is fundamentally new indeed as the 
Commission is seriously asking the other institutions and 
the European public at large for proposals to develop 
better communication on EU matters. In the pre-
Wallström era, the EP Committee on Culture – which 
also deals with communication – demanded in vain for 
more than a decade to debate the Commission’s annual 
communication priorities before their final determination. 
Now, the White Paper is starting a consultation process, 
which could improve the involvement of the major 
decision-making actors, most notably national and 
European parliamentarians.  
The fact that it took the European Commission so long to 
present its White Paper illustrates the sensitivity of the 
issue in question. In many member states politicians have 
traditionally taken a dim view of communication efforts 
by EU actors, especially by representatives from the 
European Commission. National governments prefer to 
monopolise national debates about European political 
issues and the rise of euroscepticism in domestic politics 
led to ever-closer scrutiny of whether EU communication 
does not constitute a breach of national competencies and 
waste of money. The two failed referenda on the 
Constitutional Treaty in spring 2005 provided for a 
political context that further fuelled this attitude. Cool 
reactions from several national parliaments to the 
European Parliament’s initiative to engage them in joint 
discussion forums on the future of Europe illustrated the 
limited commitment among many national decision-
makers to actively make the case for European 
integration. ‘Subsidiarity’ seems to be the word of the 
hour and for some the concept does not accommodate 
ambitious plans for European communication.  
Brussels correspondents have initially responded to the 
White Paper with a mixture of concern that they would be 
made an instrument of EU policy and (somewhat 
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ironically) fear of being bypassed by initial plans (since 
dropped) to create an EU news agency. But these critical 
reactions are not surprising, given that the draft of the 
White Paper also appeared to face a lot of criticism from 
within the Commission itself on a variety of grounds. 
Some Commissioners allegedly complained about an 
excessively self-critical tone in the text concerning the 
European institutions – an argument that had also been 
expressed about previous White Papers, namely the one 
on Governance published in June 2001. Others claimed 
that important proposals were politically unrealistic or 
legally unfeasible while yet others objected that the initial 
draft was too concerned with a democratic deficit – thus 
contesting the close link with the EU’s communication 
deficit. Finally, it was said that publication of the text 
should have taken the form of a more general Green 
Paper, as it hardly addressed questions of institutional 
implementation and financial implications.  
The present paper starts from the premise that the 
communication gap between policy-makers and citizens 
in the European Union is real and that it needs to be 
addressed if democratic processes and governance are to 
work. Although we take issue with the imprecise use of 
some of the key concepts and the often-cloudy language, 
we find that the overall approach is essentially sound and 
realistic in light of the findings published in the academic 
literature on the ‘European public sphere’ (Brüggemann 
et al., 2006; Gerhards, 2001; Meyer, 2002; Peters et al., 
2005; Trenz, 2006). The paper then goes on to assess the 
Commission’s proposals, but attempts to go beyond mere 
criticism by formulating ideas on how to substantiate the 
strategy advocated by the Commission.  
II.  Communication Policy and the European 
Public Sphere 
The Commission introduces two new terms in its White 
Paper – Communication Policy and European Public 
Sphere – but fails to define them explicitly: Defining 
these terms more precisely is not only of academic 
interest.  
The new term of a ‘Communication Policy’ encompasses 
the Commission’s claim for the introduction of a new 
field of policy as well as a new objective for the area of 
communication. Previously, there was no communication 
policy but rather a strategy for information and 
communication, there was no Commissioner for 
Communication and DG Communication was called DG 
Press.
5 In its own words, the Commission wants to move 
from information to communication and it wants to 
establish communication as a policy in its own right with 
                                                        
5 The first Communication Commissioner was Joäo de Deus 
Pinheiro, who served under the last Delors Commission. He 
faced the severe blow from the Danish ‘no’ vote on the 
Maastricht Treaty as well as resistance from Directorates-
General, other Commissioners and Delors himself to 
thoroughly reform the European Commission’s public 
communication (see Gramberger, 1997). 
the ultimate aim of developing a ‘”European public 
sphere where the European debate can unfold” (European 
Commission, 2006, p. 4). If the new approach is applied 
in a meaningful way, it will treat the question of how to 
communicate with citizens as a political question where 
democracy is at stake and not only as an instrument of 
‘selling’ policies (see Brüggemann, 2005).  
The overall approach taken by the White Paper to EU 
communication can only be welcomed, as the issue is 
now put on the political agenda. It will no longer only be 
dealt with by administrators below the level of political 
decision-makers – as was the case under the Prodi 
Commission. At the same time, the new label of 
‘communication policy’ instead of ‘information policy’ 
suggests a move away from one-way information towards 
real interaction with citizens.
6  
Indeed, ‘communication policy’ is an ambitious term as 
both parts of it are – so far – wishful thinking. To fully 
establish it as a field of EU policy, the treaties would 
have to be revised. According to its legal service, the 
Commission has the right to inform EU citizens about its 
own activities as part of its institutional prerogatives, but 
there is no clear mandate to devise a general 
communication policy of the EU. The competences for 
communication as well as the related key issues of civic 
education and media policy lie largely with the member 
states. European institutions can only act within the 
limited legal framework and with the scarce resources 
that the current conditions allow them. While no one 
would dispute the EU’s competence to inform citizens 
about policy results, the creation of a ‘European public 
sphere’ is a much more ambitious goal. To strengthen any 
concrete initiative following the White Paper, the Council 
and the European Parliament should give the 
Commission a well-defined mandate and not only a 
budget for communication. Under these circumstances, it 
is thus tactically wise that the proposals in the second part 
of the White Paper do not create the impression of 
‘imposing’ solutions from Brussels.  
Unfortunately, however, the White Paper does not 
provide a clear definition of the ‘European public sphere’ 
it envisages. While competing conceptualisations of what 
constitutes a public sphere exist, one can best describe it 
as a ‘space’ within which citizens, civil society 
organisations and political actors publicly debate issues 
of common concern. The function of a public sphere in a 
democracy is usually three-fold (Meyer, 2002: 68-71): 
1)  To enable citizens to form an informed opinion about 
how they can connect their own preferences with the 
political options available,  
                                                        
6 Analytically, the term ‘information policy’ is more adequate 
of course, as it still deals with the information activities of the 
EU institutions and it remains to be seen whether citizens are 
willing to interact. The Commission White Paper on Communication | 3 
 
2)  To hold decision-makers accountable for their 
actions by scrutinising political personnel in-between 
elections, and  
3)  To contribute to overall social cohesion and trust 
within a society by giving a wide range of groups 
within the society an opportunity to make their voice 
heard.  
In contrast to negotiations among business partners, 
debates are not decided by bargaining and differences of 
power, but by the strength of the better argument leading 
to an acceptable compromise. Ultimately, the main 
contribution of a public sphere to democracy is its ability 
to transform isolated individuals into a community of 
active, informed and mutually trusting citizens. 
But what makes a public sphere ‘European’? The White 
Paper initially (p. 5) seems to conceive of a European 
public sphere as a truly transnational place, where pan-
European media and parties shape public discourse and a 
common political culture. It then sets out that Europe 
must find ‘its place’ in national debates as if this was 
something analytically separate. This conjures up the 
unfortunate image of the European public sphere as the 
equivalent of national public sphere writ-large, something 
that may be appropriate to a superstate, but not a political 
entity, which depends heavily on political legitimacy 
from citizens organised within nation states. Moreover, 
the research in the area of European political 
communication shows that pan-European media lack 
mass-appeal and are unlikely to increase their market 
share beyond interested elite-circles for the foreseeable 
future. At the same time, the salience of EU issues and 
institutions has increased in national media coverage, 
albeit slowly and with important national variations,
7 
while genuine transnational debates
8 are a sporadic and 
still rather rare phenomenon (see Gerhards, 2001; 
Koopmanns & Erbe, 2003; Brüggemann et al., 2006). 
What is needed thus is not the creation of a 
communication space that is detached and in competition 
with national public spheres, but rather a Europeanisation 
of national public spheres, accompanied by a closer 
alignment of national debates with those policy-oriented 
discussions that have been taking place for years in 
specialised European fora and media.  
The national spheres are thus constitutive elements of a 
European public sphere and this fact is also largely 
reflected in the approach of the White Paper. The core 
idea that the Commission rightly pursues is that European 
issues and non-national actors need to become more 
visible within national public debates as the primary 
place for public opinion formation. To strengthen this 
dimension of the European public sphere is, however 
implicit, at the core of the European communication 
policy that the Commission wishes to establish in 
partnership with the member states.  
                                                        
7 So-called ‘vertical Europeanisation’. 
8 So-called ‘horizontal Europeanisation’. 
III.  The Communication Gap and the 
Approach of the White Paper 
In reading the White Paper, one finds an interesting 
difference between the rather clear – albeit still 
diplomatic – analysis of the existing problems on the one 
hand and the very cloudy language concerning concrete 
improvements on the other. Although a first draft was 
more outspoken in its criticism of the institutions for 
merely holding a “monologue” instead of a “dialogue” 
with citizens, the main symptoms of the problem are 
analysed quite precisely:  
•  Too little coordination among actors; 
•  Insufficient involvement from national, regional and 
local actors; and 
•  Too little focus on citizens’ concerns.  
This diagnosis is not new – as several Commission 
Communications of recent years show – but, in contrast 
to earlier texts, the current structures are not presented as 
something that can be ‘fixed’ quite easily by some sort of 
administrative exercise. 
Unfortunately, however, the underlying reasons why a 
short-term approach is insufficient are hardly addressed 
in the White Paper. Good communication is not simply a 
matter of good intentions and new coordinating 
mechanisms, but also of political incentives connected to 
the exercise of power and the selection of personnel, legal 
mandates and financial resources. The Commission 
rightly stresses that its success will largely depend on the 
commitment of national, regional and local actors. 
Without the ‘partnership approach’, the White Paper is 
certain to meet the same fate as the several other well-
meaning initiatives of previous years.  
It is also encouraging that the White Paper goes against a 
logic that has dominated European integration for a very 
long time and that is enjoying a certain revival after the 
‘no’ votes to the European Constitution. An increasing 
number of decision-makers like to concentrate on policy 
output and underline the fact that the EU has always 
derived its legitimacy from ‘good results’. According to 
this view, Europe should ‘deliver’ jobs and growth and 
everything would be just fine. Regrettably, this view 
ignores the fact that successes are easily claimed by the 
national level, while 'Brussels' is conveniently made the 
scapegoat for failures. The White Paper therefore rightly 
states that ‘content’ is important, but not sufficient. 
Policy also needs to be communicated and those affected 
must be involved in the shaping of the ultimate outcome. 
Unfortunately this still happens too rarely and too late in 
the policy process. 
As regards the consultation process on the White Paper, it 
seems the Commission is sincerely interested in soliciting 
stakeholders’ ideas. On the other hand, there is the clear 
risk that once again only the ‘usual suspects’ who are 
already close to the European institutions are contributing 
to this exercise. It remains to be seen what kind of reach 
the announced ‘stakeholder forums’ will actually 4 |Kurpas, Brüggemann & Meyer 
 
develop. It is essential that the Commission ensures that 
the discussion attracts those citizens and representatives 
of media and NGOs who do not usually contribute to 
debates at the European level: local and regional actors 
who have a pivotal role in the everyday life of many 
citizens.  
It is understandable that the Commission intends to 
summarise the debate and to draw its own conclusions, as 
that would allow it to maintain a high degree of control 
over the results. However, there is a clear danger that 
‘unwanted’ results are going to be filtered out at some 
stage in the evaluation process. A better solution would 
therefore be to form a broad-based panel made up, for 
example, by Commissioner Wallström and 
representatives of the European Parliament, the EU 
presidency and a European journalist association to 
review all the feedback received on the White Paper and 
to jointly draft the final report. 
IV.  Assessment of the Commission’s 
Proposals 
This section examines those elements of the 
Commission’s proposals that seem most relevant to a 
successful European Communication Policy and 
discusses them in greater detail. 
1.  A European Charter or Code of Conduct 
on Communication 
The Commission puts forward the principles of the right 
to information and freedom of expression, inclusiveness, 
diversity and participation of the citizens as the basis of 
public debate about European integration and suggests 
that they should be further elaborated into a European 
Charter or Code of Conduct on Communication, which 
should engage not only the EU institutions but also 
national, regional and local governments and NGOs. The 
main purpose of the code as we see it would be to 
promote a sense of responsibility for ensuring that 
citizens have access to sufficient information about EU 
issues to form their opinions and that certain ground rules 
of European public discourse are followed. 
While a code of conduct is certainly an appealing idea, 
the White Paper does not clarify a crucial question: How 
can one ensure that it’s being complied with? That is, is 
the code supposed to be voluntary or should it be legally 
obligatory? 
The question implies a difficult balancing act, given that 
a code would need to bind a large number of actors to be 
effective. But a code that binds civil society or the media 
should not be designed in the context of a White Paper by 
the European Commission. The independence of non-
state actors is at the very heart of the idea of a public 
sphere. Reporting about the EU in a manner that may be 
regarded as too one-sided or negative by the EU 
institutions is part of the freedom of the press and the 
freedom of speech; the EU should defend these principles 
rather than be seen as infringing upon them. 
Consequently, journalists or NGOs should be asked to 
come up with their own code of conduct on how to cover 
EU affairs. European journalists’ associations could 
establish a European press council which could watch 
over such a voluntary commitment. The enforcement 
would take place through ‘naming and shaming’. In order 
to achieve sufficient take-up, one would need to think of 
the code less as a rule book, but more as a visible 
certificate of quality that different organisations and 
actors would aspire to be awarded, as in the case of eco-
labelling.  
In the context of the White Paper, however, European 
institutions as well as national, regional and local 
government actors should develop a code of conduct, 
which covers their own communication activities. 
Participation would be voluntary, but if this code is meant 
to be more than a mere formality, it must impose some 
element of obligation on the participating parties at all 
levels involved. The code should therefore clearly state 
how the respective actors commit themselves to the 
promotion of a European Public Sphere. One of the main 
purposes of a code of conduct must be to insure that 
communication policy is distinct from the mere ‘selling’ 
of the EU. It primarily has to serve the citizens and must 
be consistent with democratic principles. Therefore, EU 
institutions and national governments should sign a code 
that commits them to active communication about the 
EU, transparency and dialogue with the citizens. It should 
include the respect of public institutions towards the 
freedom of expression of the citizens and the editorial 
freedom of the press. The code would have to protect 
those organisations and media that receive financial 
support from the EU from editorial interference. The 
code could also oblige national governments to inform 
their citizens about which policies they were pursuing in 
the Council and how they have voted, thereby also ending 
the practice at member state level of making the 
Commission a scapegoat for any unpopular policies. 
Heads of state and government should commit 
themselves to publicly explain to their respective national 
parliaments their position on the issues of the EU 
presidency’s priorities and positions they have taken 
during the preceding presidency. Such an account should 
be made twice a year, after the presentation by each new 
EU presidency of its priorities to the European 
Parliament. Governments could also commit to set up a 
network of national websites giving their position on EU 
issues and to give up the right to veto the application of 
the EU transparency regime to national documents which 
form part of the EU’s policy-making process.
9 Generally 
speaking, such a code of conduct could help to make a 
                                                        
9 The transparency rules of the EU (Regulation No. 1049/2001, 
Art. 4, 4-5) demand that the Commission consults the member 
states on access to the national documents which are held by 
the Commission. Consequently, the member states can 
effectively take these documents related to EU policy-making 
beyond the reach of the EU regulation on transparency. The Commission White Paper on Communication | 5 
 
less restrictive interpretation of the existing regulation on 
transparency prevail against the current use of its 
exceptional clauses. 
Finally, the code of conduct should be given some teeth 
via the creation of an independent authority to which 
people could submit complaints. The European 
Ombudsman would be well suited to pursue cases of 
maladministration or the violation of such a code of 
conduct by the European institutions. S/he should be 
given the necessary resources to properly take up this 
additional responsibility. In pursuing this task, s/he might 
be joined by an ‘Advisory Board on European 
Communication’ comprised of journalists’ associations, 
civil society representatives as well as national and 
European parliamentarians.  
2. Civic  Education 
The Maastricht Treaty created the notion of European 
Union citizenship, but Eurobarometer surveys reveal that 
most citizens have a very limited understanding of how 
the EU works, what it does and how they are able to 
influence policy. A large majority of citizens, for 
instance, see the Council of Ministers only as a meeting 
forum, not a place for law- and decision-making. The 
European Parliament’s powers are underestimated, and as 
a consequence the turn-out for its elections has declined 
in recent decades. Moreover, history books and teaching 
in some countries have been narrowly focused on the 
evolution of the nation states in Europe and less than half 
of Europe’s population are able to speak more than one 
foreign language fluently. The Commission is right in 
highlighting that civic education at all levels, but 
especially in schools, should ensure that citizens across 
the EU acquire the knowledge and the skills to fully 
participate in democratic processes at national and 
European levels. Both levels are interconnected – one 
cannot function without the other.  
While it is true that civic education remains the 
responsibility of national and regional authorities, 
education experts and teachers from across the EU could 
be invited to learn from each others teaching and to work 
on a ‘European core curriculum’ for teaching the 
European dimension in the areas of politics, history and 
languages. This ‘core curriculum’ would comprise the 
absolute basics in the above-mentioned areas that every 
high school student in Europe should learn. A first step in 
the development of such a curriculum could be to invite a 
group of education experts to draft a report on what civic 
education should look like in contemporary Europe. As a 
second step, a small think-tank or institute should be 
established with a ‘virtual presence’ on the internet, 
including a growing database with teaching materials in 
different languages. In a third step such a think-tank 
could moderate and fuel a debate among national 
decision-makers on how to make Europe part of the 
national curricula. 
3.  Dialogue with Citizens 
Unfortunately, the Commission does not convincingly 
demonstrate how the feedback of EU policies from 
millions of EU citizens can be taken into account in a 
systematic way by an already-overstretched 
administration. The suggested monitoring of public 
opinion and the formation of focus groups may help the 
College of Commissioners avoid public outcries in some 
member states about particular initiatives. Also, polls can 
be used as an incentive for political actors to become 
more active, if they include approval and visibility 
ratings. Nevertheless, the White Paper attaches too much 
importance to opinion monitoring and polling. While 
creating networks of national polling experts may be 
useful in fostering a European dimension in opinion 
polling, they cannot replace the job of European 
institutions to reach out and engage citizens in an 
interactive dialogue. Such instruments certainly cannot be 
substitutes for giving citizens a real stake in the decision-
making process. 
As a matter of principle, parliamentarians and not civil 
servants should bear the main responsibility for 
channelling citizens’ views into the political process. The 
proposed ‘joint open debates’ by the European 
institutions can be helpful, but there is a clear risk that 
they become just another ‘Brussels-talking-to-Brussels’ 
exercise. To involve a larger audience and to make it 
more attractive for the media, journalists must be able to 
publicly address questions directly to the speakers at 
these events. 
A more ambitious approach would be to organise a 
European ‘deliberative poll’
10 or even a ‘European 
deliberation day’ where debates would be held on 
‘European’ topics in the EP as well as in national 
parliaments to allow citizens to voice their views and 
expectations in concrete policy areas. Participants would 
be invited on a random basis to avoid an over-
representation of those ‘already in the know’ and they 
would be provided with background information from 
different experts before and throughout the debates. The 
outreach would be enhanced by inviting national 
television stations to broadcast the event in an attractive 
format. Such a debate would highlight the role of 
parliaments as fora of open exchange of views and have 
the potential to attract strong media attention.  
4.  The Partnership Approach: Reaching 
beyond ‘Planet Brussels’ 
The effort to implement an effective communication 
policy will surely fail, if local, regional and national 
actors cannot be sufficiently involved to ensure that not it 
is only the ‘usual suspects’ who participate in the debates 
about EU-related issues. This is probably the most 
                                                        
10 The concept of a ‘deliberative poll’ has been developed by 
Robert C. Luskin and James S. Fishkin. For a more detailed 
discussion, see Luskin et al. (2002). 6 |Kurpas, Brüggemann & Meyer 
 
important aspect of the entire White Paper. Accordingly, 
communication-related projects that receive funding must 
include criteria that allow an assessment not only of how 
many, but also of who  is reached by the respective 
project. Priority should be given to those projects that aim 
beyond those who are already ‘in the know’. Only 
projects with a strong multiplier effect should be 
subsidised. Too often money is spent on well-intended 
projects where the inhabitants of ‘Planet Brussels’ end up 
talking to each other. Joint initiatives of member states as 
well as EU programmes should actively support the 
establishment and maintenance of cross-national 
networks that enable European citizens with similar 
interests or professional backgrounds to meet each other 
face-to-face. Regional and local actors are often 
interested, but need coordination assistance and funding 
to engage in the establishment of such issue-based 
transnational networks. 
National parliaments should strive to pay more attention 
to European legislative projects much earlier in the 
decision-making process, so that national debates do not 
take place too late in the process, allowing national actors 
to present legislation as an ‘illegitimate act’ from the 
Brussels bureaucracy. National parliaments are better-
placed than any of the European institutions to stimulate 
debate among a broader public and to draw media 
attention to a particular issue. However, the extent to 
which national parliaments are engaged in generating 
debate on European issues still varies widely from 
country to country. A generally more pro-active role 
would associate national parliaments with the European 
policy process beyond the necessary, but defensive role 
as a watchdog on subsidiarity issues (see Kurpas et al., 
2005). 
The ‘Advisory Board on European Communication’ (see 
recommendation under earlier discussion on a European 
Charter on Communication), consisting of journalists, 
representatives of civil society, national and European 
parliamentarians and the European Ombudsman, should 
monitor the efficiency of EU communication policy. In 
this capacity, it should not only observe whether 
institutions are violating the ‘code of conduct’, but also 
give concrete advice for improving the policy’s 
implementation. 
5. Involving  the  Media 
Europe by Satellite (EbS) should indeed be upgraded, as 
proposed by the White Paper. However, this should not 
lead to the creation of an EU-run news agency, which 
would always be vulnerable to accusations of 
disseminating ‘Brussels-propaganda’, which would 
probably cause more harm than it would solve existing 
problems. Therefore, EbS broadcasts should be used 
instead to further strengthen EU coverage in the existing 
media, especially in those working at the regional and 
local level. In order to do so more effectively, EbS should 
continually solicit ideas and advice from regional and 
local journalists through the Advisory Board (see above) 
on how to serve them best. Additionally, EbS could 
provide the EUROPA website with audio-visual content.  
6.  The Role of Commissioners 
In the White Paper itself, the Commission does not 
comment in great detail on its own role in improving 
European communication, as it has already made a 
substantial contribution in this area in the Action Plan to 
Improve Communicating Europe by the Commission, 
which was in fact issued half a year before the White 
Paper. However, the unique consultation process started 
for the White Paper should by all means include a 
discussion of the Commission’s own role in 
‘communicating Europe’ and therefore the measures 
proposed in the action plan. It comprises 50 measures 
which – very generally speaking – can only be welcomed. 
Whether implementation of these measures will actually 
take place, however, remains to be seen. There is reason 
to be cautious, given previous experiences (Gramberger, 
1997; Meyer, 1999).  
Not all of the 50 measures can be discussed here, but one 
key proposal – the one on how Commissioners can be 
more involved in communicating with national publics 
(European Commission, 2005, p. 5) – does deserve a 
closer look. The heads of EU representations will always 
lack seniority and political clout to make the same public 
impact as a Commissioner. Because of the way in which 
they are appointed and given the stage they have reached 
in their careers, however, Commissioners have little 
motivation to actively campaign for new initiatives and 
proposals beyond ‘the country they know best’. The 
recent creation of a Communication Programming Group 
of Commissioners to advise the College on 
communication priorities and activities is a first welcome 
step as are regular debates about communication issues 
within the College, but it is not enough to address the 
communication shortcomings of the College itself. We 
suggest the creation of issue- and country-specific 
‘communication tandems’, comprising the relevant 
commissioners with portfolio and country-of-origin 
competences. For instance, in order to persuade public 
opinion in particular countries critical of enlargement, the 
Commissioner for Enlargement should consult with the 
Commissioner originating from the countries about what 
the key concerns are, what information is needed, and 
how both politicians could engage the respective national 
publics through a series of communication actions. These 
should be reinforced by an annual intra-College peer-
review concerning communication activities. 
Commissioners should also report on their websites the 
number of interviews they have given and with whom – 
not only in their home country but also in the other 
member states. So far, even prominent Commissioners 
may be successful in catching the attention of media in 
their home country, but they largely fail in attracting 
coverage in other member states. In order to achieve this 
goal, the press offices of the Commission (the speakers’ 
service in Brussels as well as in the Representations) The Commission White Paper on Communication | 7 
 
would have to have more staff with professional 
communications backgrounds – something which the 
action plan foresees, but it remains to be seen whether it 
will be implemented. 
For the action plan, the Commission has given a clear 
timetable, so that implementation can be checked. The 
same should be done when the White Paper is turned into 
concrete policy proposals at the end of the consultation 
period. Only by adopting and adhering to a very clear 
plan for the follow-up of the exercise can the EU prove 
that it takes communication policy seriously. 
V.  Concrete Proposals for an EU 
Communication Policy: An Agenda for 
Action 
Building on our assessment of the White Paper, we put 
forward the following ten concrete ‘proposals for action’: 
1.  The  European Charter/Code of Conduct must 
include  binding commitments on the part of 
European, national, regional and local authorities that 
sign up to it. The charter/code must clearly state what 
form the commitments will take for each actor in 
the promotion of a European public sphere. For media 
and other non-public actors, we propose a voluntary, 
self-regulatory approach (e.g. a European Press 
Council founded by journalist associations), which 
rewards compliance with the ground rules of 
democratic information and communication with a 
quality award. 
2.  An Advisory Board on European Communication 
consisting of national and European parliamentarians, 
journalists, representatives of civil society and the 
European Ombudsman, should monitor the 
efficiency as well as the acceptability of the EU 
communication policy according to the code of 
conduct. As such, it could for example deal with 
citizens’ complaints about the institutions violating 
the code of conduct and give advice for concrete 
improvements of the policy’s implementation. 
3.  Education experts and teachers from across the EU 
should develop a European core curriculum that 
fleshes out the European dimension in the areas of 
politics, history and geography as well as language 
instruction. The ‘core curriculum’ would comprise the 
absolute basics that every regular high school student 
in Europe should know. It should be developed in the 
three-step process outlined above ultimately 
establishing an institute that promoted the presence of 
‘Europe’ in national curricula. 
4.  Public ‘deliberation’ events designed to fully 
explore certain topics of relevance for all of Europe, 
such as a ‘Deliberative Poll’, should be organised in a 
transnational or even pan-European context, to reach 
beyond those who are ‘already in the know’. 
Television coverage would make these events 
interesting for a broader public. In a long-term 
perspective, even an annual ‘European deliberation 
day’ could be envisaged. 
5.  All EU-funded programmes related to 
communication must be selected on grounds of their 
potential to reach beyond the ‘Brussels insiders’. 
Joint initiatives of member states as well as EU-
funded programmes in the area of active citizenship 
should actively support the establishment and 
maintenance of transnational networks that enable 
European citizens with similar interests or 
professional backgrounds to meet each other face-to-
face. Assistance in coordination and funding should 
be given to regional and local actors to help them 
establish such issue-based transnational networks.  
6.  National parliaments in all member states should 
make a commitment in the code of conduct to raise 
public awareness about major European legislative 
projects at an earlier stage of the decision-making 
process. In doing so, they contribute to holding 
national governments accountable when they legislate 
in the Council.  
7.  Heads of state and government should commit 
themselves in the code of conduct to publicly explain 
to their respective national parliament their 
position on the issues of the EU presidency’s 
priorities and the positions they have taken during the 
preceding presidency. Governments should also 
commit to setting up a network of national websites 
giving their position on EU issues, including their 
votes in all Council decisions and to giving up the 
right to veto the application of the EU transparency 
regime to national documents which form part of the 
EU’s policy-making process. 
8.  Media (including regional and local) should be 
contacted on a regular basis to find out how the 
Commission’s Audiovisual Service – and especially 
Europe by Satellite (EbS) – as well as the press 
service in general can best help them to develop a 
European dimension in their news coverage. EbS 
could also provide the EUROPA website with 
interactive content.  
9.  The consultation process on the White Paper should 
also include the proposals concerning the Commission 
mentioned in its Action Plan. In this context, the 
incentives for Commissioners to communicate 
more actively should in particular be increased. 
Issue- and country-specific ‘communication 
tandems’ of different Commissioners should be 
created, comprising portfolio and country-of-origin 
competences. An annual intra-College peer review 
and documentation on Commissioners’ websites 
concerning their media activities should be envisaged. 
Public opinion polls should be used to measure the 
visibility and approval ratings of individual 
Commissioners and other European actors – as is 
already done with national actors. Such polls help to 
personalise EU politics by providing European news 
coverage with ‘human faces’. 8 |Kurpas, Brüggemann & Meyer 
 
VI. Conclusions: Beyond Communication… 
A European Communication Policy reaching beyond the 
‘Brussels insiders’ would certainly be a major step 
forward. Taking into account the experiences of the last 
10 years, however, it is far from sure that this time the 
EU will succeed. Much will depend on the efficient 
implementation of the final outcome and the active 
support from national, regional and local actors, without 
which the task would be impossible. However, whatever 
efforts concerning European communication will be 
agreed, there should be no illusion that listening alone 
will be sufficient to trigger citizens’ engagement in what 
the Commission hopes to be a vibrant European public 
sphere. Communication mostly occurs when citizens feel 
that they have a ‘say’ on different (policy) options, which 
means that they actually must be convinced that their 
opinion also makes a difference and counts for 
something. This is most visible in referenda on EU 
issues, which are generally quite effective in mobilising 
public communication.  
The changes needed to give citizens a real ‘say’, 
however, go far beyond purely communicative measures 
and in many cases would require treaty reform. The 
citizens’ right to petition the Commission for action in a 
certain policy field can be mentioned as one example that 
would actually not require such a treaty change. 
Similarly, the European Commission could take further 
steps towards formalising the processes by which the 
European Parliament, in its capacity as the directly 
elected representative of European citizens, gives impetus 
for new initiatives. By so doing, it would turn a de facto 
practice into visible reality
11 and boost the public’s 
perception of the EP as a legislator with real power to 
influence the agenda in EU decision-making.  
In any event, one thing must be clear to everyone: As 
important as a good communication policy will be for the 
future development of the EU, it cannot be a substitute 
for offering citizens clear choices in the European 
decision-making process. 
So our tenth and final recommendation reads:  
10. Continue the democratisation of the EU. 
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